# ASU Cards Round 5 CEDA

## 1NC

### 1

#### The aff isn't topical:

#### A. Increase is net increase

**Rogers, 5** (Judge, STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT, NSR MANUFACTURERS ROUNDTABLE, ET AL., INTERVENORS, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12378, \*\*; 60 ERC (BNA) 1791, 6/24, lexis)

 [\*\*48]  Statutory Interpretation. HN16While the CAA defines a "modification" as any physical or operational change that "increases" emissions, it is silent on how to calculate such "increases" in emissions. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4). According to government petitioners, the lack of a statutory definition does not render the term "increases" ambiguous, but merely compels the court to give the term its "ordinary meaning." See Engine Mfrs.Ass'nv.S.Coast AirQualityMgmt.Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761, 158 L. Ed. 2d 529(2004); Bluewater Network, 370 F.3d at 13; Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Glickman, 342 U.S. App. D.C. 7, 215 F.3d 7, 10 [\*23]  (D.C. Cir. 2000). Relying on two "real world" analogies, government petitioners contend that **the ordinary meaning of "increases" requires the baseline to be calculated from a period immediately preceding the change.** They maintain, for example, that in determining whether a high-pressure weather system "increases" the local temperature, the relevant baseline is the temperature immediately preceding the arrival of the weather system, not the temperature five or ten years ago. Similarly,  [\*\*49]  in determining whether a new engine "increases" the value of a car, the relevant baseline is the value of the car immediately preceding the replacement of the engine, not the value of the car five or ten years ago when the engine was in perfect condition.

#### B. War Powers Authority refers to capacities explicitly granted by Congress – that means the aff must restrict authority under the WPR, AUMF, or NDAA.

Gallagher 11 served as an F/A-18C Pilot, Air Officer, and F/A-18C/D Flight Instructor in the US Marine Corps operating forces. He worked Security Assistance initiatives for the US European Command and most recently as a Joint Planner in the USEUCOM J3 and J5. Gallagher is currently assigned to the Joint Staff, Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell (Joseph V. III, *Parameters*, Summer 2011, pp. 23-24, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/ Articles/2011summer/Gallagher.pdf)

First, consider the constitutional issue of power imbalance. Central to the Constitution is the foundational principle of power distribution and provisions to check and balance exercises of that power. This clearly intended separation of powers across the three branches of government ensures that no single federal officeholder can wield an inordinate amount of power or influence. **The founders carefully crafted constitutional war-making authority** **with** the branch most representative of the people—**Congress**.4 The Federalist Papers No. 51, “The Structure of Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments,” serves as the wellspring for this principle. Madison insisted on the necessity to prevent any particular interest or group to trump another interest or group.5 This principle applies in practice to all decisions of considerable national importance. **Specific to** war powers authority**, the Constitution empowers the legislative branch with the authority to declare war but endows the Executive with the authority to act as Commander-in-Chief**.6 This construct designates **Congress, not the president, as the primary decisionmaking body to commit the nation to war**—a decision that ultimately requires the consent and will of the people in order to succeed. By vesting the decision to declare war with Congress, the founders underscored their intention to engage the people—those who would ultimately sacrifice their blood and treasure in the effort. **The Constitution**, on the other hand, **vaguely delegates authority to execute foreign policy. It contains no instructions regarding the use or custody of that power, except to “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States**.”7 Alexander Hamilton, known widely as an advocate of executive power, asserted: "The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a President of the United States."8 Accordingly, the **founders never intended for the military to serve as the nation’s primary agency to interface with the rest of the world or stand as the dominant instrument of foreign policy. So the presidential authority of** Commander-in-Chief does not permit **a president to use the nation’s military simply to execute a president’s foreign policy.**9 Kenneth B. Moss, Undeclared War and the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 217.

#### C. Restrictions must refer to a specific statutory source on which to base prohibitions—asserting illegitimacy isn't the same

**Bradley, 10** - \* Richard A. Horvitz Professor of Law and Professor of Public Policy Studies, Duke Law School (Curtis, “CLEAR STATEMENT RULES AND EXECUTIVE WAR POWERS” <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2730&context=faculty_scholarship>)

The scope of the President’s independent war powers is notoriously unclear, and courts are understandably reluctant to issue constitutional rulings that might deprive the federal government as a whole of the flexibility needed to respond to crises. As a result, courts often look for signs that Congress has either supported or opposed the President’s actions and rest their decisions on statutory grounds. This is essentially the approach outlined by Justice Jackson in his concurrence in Youngstown.1 For the most part, the Supreme Court has also followed this approach in deciding executive power issues relating to the war on terror. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, for example, Justice O’Connor based her plurality decision, which allowed for military detention of a U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan, on Congress’s September 18, 2001, Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).2 Similarly, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court grounded its disallowance of the Bush Administration’s military commission system on what it found to be congressionally imposed restrictions.3 The Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush4 might seem an aberration in this regard, but it is not. Although the Court in Boumediene did rely on the Constitution in holding that the detainees at Guantanamo have a right to seek habeas corpus re‐ view in U.S. courts, it did not impose any specific restrictions on the executive’s detention, treatment, or trial of the detainees.5 In other words, Boumediene was more about preserving a role for the courts than about prohibiting the executive from exercising statutorily conferred authority.

#### Vote negative:

#### 1. It’s the basis for neg prep which is key to engage affs without unreasonable demands on 2Ns—educational debates with viable workloads are key to any vision for the activity—also directly key to participation.

#### 2. War powers debates are good—without topicality, there’s a competitive incentive to avoid them and the neg ground associated—

Kurr 2013 – Ph.D. student in the Communication Arts & Sciences program at Pennsylvania State University and a coach for the Penn State Debate Society (9/5, UVA Miller Center & CEDA Public Debate Series, “Bridging Competitive Debate and Public Deliberation on Presidential War Powers”, http://public.cedadebate.org/node/14)

Taken together, the connection between tournament competition and a public collaboration reorients the pedagogical function of debate. Gordon Mitchell and his colleagues comment on this possibility, “The debate tournament site’s potential to work as a translational pipeline for scholarly research presents unique opportunities for colleges and universities seeking to bolster their institutional infrastructure for undergraduate research” (Mitchell et al, 2010, p. 15). Indeed, the debate series affords competitors the opportunity to become part of the discussion and inform policymakers about potential positions, as opposed to the traditional reactionary format of hosting public debates at the season’s end. Empirically, these events had the effect of “giv[ing] voice to previously buried arguments” that “subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations” (Mitchell, 2010, p. 107). Given the timeliness of the topic, these debates provide a new voice into the ongoing deliberation over war powers and help make the fruits of competitive research have a public purpose. The second major function concerns the specific nature of deliberation over war powers. Given the connectedness between presidential war powers and the preservation of national security, deliberation is often difficult. Mark Neocleous describes that when political issues become securitized; it “helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms.” (2008, p. 71). Collegiate debaters, through research and competitive debate, serve as a bulwark against this “short-circuiting” and help preserve democratic deliberation. This is especially true when considering national security issues. Eric English contends, “The success … in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security politics points to efficacy of academic debate as a training ground.” Part of this training requires a “robust understanding of the switch-side technique” which “helps prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies” (English et. al, 2007, p. 224). Hence, competitive debate training provides foundation for interrogating these policies in public. Alarmism on the issues of war powers is easily demonstrated by Obama’s repeated attempts to transfer detainees from Guantanamo Bay. Republicans were able to launch a campaign featuring the slogan, “not in my backyard” (Schor, 2009). By locating the nexus of insecurity as close as geographically possible, the GOP were able to instill a fear of national insecurity that made deliberation in the public sphere not possible. When collegiate debaters translate their knowledge of the policy wonkery on such issues into public deliberation, it serves to cut against the alarmist rhetoric purported by opponents. In addition to combating misperceptions concerning detainee transfers, the investigative capacity of collegiate debate provides a constant check on governmental policies. A new trend concerning national security policies has been for the government to provide “status updates” to the public. On March 28, 2011, Obama gave a speech concerning Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya and the purpose of the bombings. Jeremy Engels and William Saas describe this “post facto discourse” as a “new norm” where “Americans are called to acquiesce to decisions already made” (2013, p. 230). Contra to the alarmist strategy that made policy deliberation impossible, this rhetorical strategy posits that deliberation is not necessary. Collegiate debaters researching war powers are able to interrogate whether deliberation is actually needed. Given the technical knowledge base needed to comprehend the mechanism of how war powers operate, debate programs serve as a constant investigation into whether deliberation is necessary not only for prior action but also future action. By raising public awareness, there is a greater potential that “the public’s inquiry into potential illegal action abroad” could “create real incentives to enforce the WPR” (Druck, 2010, p. 236). While this line of interrogation could be fulfilled by another organization, collegiate debaters who translate their competitive knowledge into public awareness create a “space for talk” where the public has “previously been content to remain silent” (Engels & Saas, 2013, p. 231). Given the importance of presidential war powers and the strategies used by both sides of the aisle to stifle deliberation, the import of competitive debate research into the public realm should provide an additional check of being subdued by alarmism or acquiescent rhetorics. After creating that space for deliberation, debaters are apt to influence the policies themselves. Mitchell furthers, “Intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process” (2010, p. 107). With the timeliness of the war powers controversy and the need for competitive debate to reorient publicly, the CEDA/Miller Center series represents a symbiotic relationship that ought to continue into the future. Not only will collegiate debaters become better public advocates by shifting from competition to collaboration, the public becomes more informed on a technical issue where deliberation was being stifled. As a result, debaters reinvigorate debate.

#### 3. External regulations are key to agonistic deliberation

Acampora 3 (Nietzsche-Studien 32 (2003), "Demos Agonistes Redux: Reflections on the Streit of Political Agonism," christaacampora.com/uploads/news/id16/Demos Agonistes Redux.pdf)

Support for Dombowsky's claims depends upon attributing to Nietzsche interest in a strict and rigid rank ordering. The evidence he mounts for ths claim (again, drawn from fragments of a great variety of sources) supports the latter (i. e. rank ordering) without the qualifications that Dombowsky wishes to associate with it, namely its rgidio. Ths opens up a concern that apparently continues to need to be addressed despite the fact that intehgent discussions of these matters have appeared in the secondary literature. The issue can be more narrowly focused in addressing the following question: What is the relation between the openness ofthe agon and the creation of new values? Surely, Nietzsche's philosophy aims at creating new values and supporting those who might become their legislators. This does not translate into allowing everyone to become one's own legslator of values such that what we are left with is a great relativism (the battle over how Nietzsche's perspectivism stands in relation to relativism has already been won, I take it). The point of supporting creators of new values is to have those values received and endorsed, through the ways in which said values animate and make possible vibrant forms of life by those who hold them. How does the agon negotiate not only the sorting out of dfference but also the regulation of the standards of judgment? Nietzsche admires the agon not because of its tolerance and sheer variety. It is hailed specifically and repeatedly as a mechanism for the production of value through which indwiduals and communities become bound to, not liberatedji-om the claims of values of others. The linchpin of Dombowsky's case against Schrift, that the later Nietzsche unlike the author of Homer's Contest "wants the institution of agonism without the institution of ostracism"14 appears to rest upon speculation about how Nietzsche conceives the relation between the immoralists and their opponents. This relation is articulated by drawing on phrases from Twihght of the Idols and the NachlaJin which it is allegedly revealed that: Preserving opposition and war, tension and competition, is necessary and prudent for the "immoralists and anti-Christians", who see that it is to their "advantage that the Church exist" (GD Moral as Widernatur 3). They do not aim to destroy the Christian ideal but only to end its tyranny. For "the continuance of the Christian ideal is one of the most desirable things there are." The immoralists require that their enemies "retain their strength", but at the same time they want "to become master over them" (Nachlal3 1885 - 87, KSA 12,lO [I 17]), perhaps to make them an instrument of governance or for the purpose of external reg~lation.'~ And so it is here that Nietzsche himself apparently "gives up the contest" (to borrow a phrase from Nietzsche's own Homer's Contest), evident in the fact that he wants to win. But what we really have here is Dombowsky conflating the aims internal to agonistic engagement with the goals external to specific contests that support and regulate the agonistic institutions themselves. Opponents should want to win. Nietzsche never casts hs conception of the agon in any way that commits him to the facile view common in various quarters of contemporary education that "it isn't whether you win or lose but how you play the game".I6 For those participating in the contest, for those subjecting themselves to the scrutiny of the community that provides the condition for the possibility of contestation, winning is surely the primary aim, although, as I have dscussed elsewhere, this does not necessarily commit them to the view that they must seek to win at any cost.17 Clearly, desiring to compete well is compatible with desiring to win, and one might prudently strive to compete well as a means toward greater success. But truly great competitors do have an interest in competing well - in whatever ways that becomes defined by the community or institution that makes competition possible, other than merely as a means to the end of victory. What great victors want are legitimate (and legtimizing) wins. By "great victors" I mean those whose accomplishments acquire maximal meaning in their communal context. There can be little doubt that what such competitors seek for themselves is victory that is complete: namely, that whch secures their entitlement to the distinction not only of having surmounted their opposition but also of serving as the standard bearer of what constitutes excellence in the context of those particular kinds of agonistic exchange. In this sense, it seems perfectly reasonable to say that the victor wants mastev, that the victor does not wish to be subjected to ostracism, that the victor might rightly consider ostracism a violation of the terms of fair play. But that does not mean that the community that seeks its own regulation through agonistic interaction must be simdarly dsposed. Nietzsche is quite mindful of this dfference, often much more so than those who continue to wrestle with the challenges of agonistic politics today.

#### D. Voter for fairness and education.

### 2

#### The aff’s commitment to attaching ourselves to structures outside of ourselves replicates the same affect of belonging that maintains liberalism. Their optimistic belief that merely changing the way that society is structured can lead to some change promotes the same obstacle to one’s desires. We should not try to confirm the system by trying to change the system but rather turn inwards to confirm of the centrality of our own desires.

Berlant, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, ‘11

[Lauren, *Cruel Optimism*, Duke University Press, pg. 223-228, 2011, RSR]

Intensely political seasons spawn reveries of a different immediacy. People imagine alternative environments where authenticity trumps ideology, truths cannot be concealed, and communication feels intimate, face-to face. In these times, even politicians imagine occupying a post–public sphere public where they might just somehow make an unmediated transmission to the body politic. “Somehow you just got to go over the heads of the filter and speak directly to the people,” then- President George W. Bush commented in October 2003, echoing a long tradition of sentimental political fantasies and soon followed by condemnations of the “filter” by the Republican National Committee and the presidential campaign of John McCain and Sarah Palin.1 What is “the filter” that demands circumnavigation? Bush seems to be inverting the meaning of his own, mixed, metaphor. A filter, after all, separates out noise from communication and, in so doing, makes communication possible. Jacques Attali and Michel Serres have both argued that there is no communication without noise, as noise interferes from within any utterance, threatening its tractability.2 The performance of distortion that constitutes communication therefore demands discernment, or filtering. However steadfast one’s commitment to truth, there is no avoiding the noise. Yet Bush’s wish to skirt the filter points to something profound in the desire for the political. He wants to transmit not the message but the noise. He wants the public to feel the funk, the live intensities and desires that make messages affectively immediate, seductive, and binding.3 In his head a public’s binding to the political is best achieved neither by policy nor ideology but the affect of feeling political together, an effect of having communicated true feeling without the distancing mediation of speech.4 The transmission of noise performs political attachment as a sustaining intimate relation, without which great dramas of betrayal are felt and staged. In The Ethical Soundscape, Charles Hirschkind talks about the role of “maieutic listening” in constructing the intimate political publics of Egypt.5 There, the feeling tones of the affective soundscape produce attachments to and investments in a sense of political and social mutuality that is performed in moments of collective audition. This process involves taking on listening together as itself an object/scene of desire. The attainment of that attunement produces a sense of shared worldness, apart from whatever aim or claim the listening public might later bring to a particular political world because of what they have heard. From Hirschkind’s perspective the social circulation of noise, of affective binding, converts the world to a space of moral action that seems juxtapolitical— proximate to, without being compromised by, the instrumentalities of power that govern social life.6 Speaking above the filter would confirm to Bush’s whole listening audience that they already share an affective environment; mobilizing “the ethical and therapeutic virtues of the ear”7 would accomplish the visceral transmission of his assurance not only that he has made a better good life possible for Americans and humans around the globe, but that, affectively speaking, there is already a better sensorial world right here, right now, more intimate and secure and just as real as the world made by the media’s anxiogenic sensationalist analysis. This vision locates the desire for the political in an alternative commons in the present that the senses confirm and circulate as though without mediation. What exactly is the problem with “the filter”? The contemporary filtered or mediated political sphere in the United States transmits news 24/7 from a new ordinary created by crisis, in which life seems reduced to discussions about tactics for survival and who is to blame. The filter tells you that the public has entered a historical situation whose contours it does not know. It impresses itself upon mass consciousness as an epochal crisis, unfolding like a disaster film made up of human- interest stories and stories about institutions that have lost their way.8 It is a moment on the verge of a postnormative phase, in which fantasmatic clarities about the conditions for enduring collectivity, historical continuity, and infrastructural stability have melted away, along with predictable relations between event and effect. Living amidst war and environmental disaster, people are shown constantly being surprised at what does and does not seem to have a transformative impact. Living amid economic crisis, people are shown constantly being surprised at the amount, location, and enormity of moral and affective irregulation that come from fading rules of accountability and recognition. What will govern the terms and relations of reliable reciprocity among governments, intimates, workers, owners, churches, citizens, political parties, or strangers? What forms of life will secure the sense of affective democracy that people have been educated to expect from their publics? Nobody knows. The news about the recent past and the pressures of the near future demand constant emergency cleanup and hyperspeculation about what it means to live in the ongoing present among piles of cases where things didn’t work out or seem to make sense, at least not yet. There are vigils; there is witnessing, testimony, and yelling. But there is not yet a consensual rubric that would shape these matters into an event. The affective structure of the situation is therefore anxious and the political emotions attached to it veer wildly from recognition of the enigma that is clearly there to explanations that make sense, the kind of satisfying sense that enables enduring. Uncertainty is the material that Bush wished to bracket. His desire for a politics of ambient noise, prepropositional transmission, and intuitive reciprocity sought to displace the filtered story of instability and contradiction from the center of sociality. He also wishfully banished self- reflexive, cultivated opinion and judgment from their central public- sphere function. In short, as Jacques Rancière would put it, Bush’s wishful feeling was to separate the political from politics as such.9 In so doing he would cast the ongoing activity of social antagonism to the realm of the epiphenomenal, in contrast to which the affective feedback loop of the political would make stronger the true soul- to- soul continuity between politicians and their public. Foucault used to call “sexuality” that noisy affectivity that Bush wanted to transmit from mouth to ear, heart to heart, gut to gut.10 From his perspective, at least, the political is best lodged in the appetites. These are not politically tendentious observations. Perhaps when Bush uttered his desire for affective communication to be the medium of the political, he was trying cynically to distract the public gaze from some of his particular actions. But the wish to inhabit a vaguely warm sense of alreadyestablished, autonomic, and atmospheric solidarity with the body politic is hardly his special desire. Indeed, in his preference for the noise of immediacy, he has many bedfellows in the body politic with whom he shares little else politically, namely, the ones who prefer political meetings in town halls, caucuses, demonstrations, and other intimate assemblies to the pleasure of disembodied migratory identification that constitutes mass publics. He also joins his antagonists in the nondominant classes who have long produced intimate publics to provide the feeling of immediacy and solidarity by establishing in the public sphere an affective register of belonging to inhabit when there are few adequate normative institutions to fall back on, rest in, or return to. Public spheres are always affect worlds, worlds to which people are bound, when they are, by affective projections of a constantly negotiated common interestedness. But an intimate public is more specific. In an intimate public one senses that matters of survival are at stake and that collective mediation through narration and audition might provide some routes out of the impasse and the struggle of the present, or at least some sense that there would be recognition were the participants in the room together.11 An intimate public promises the sense of being held in its penumbra. You do not need to audition for membership in it. Minimally, you need just to perform audition, to listen and to be interested in the scene’s visceral impact.12 You might have been drawn to it because of a curiosity about something minor, unassociated with catastrophe, like knitting or collecting something, or having a certain kind of sexuality, only after which it became a community of support, offering tones of suffering, humor, and cheerleading. Perhaps an illness led to seeking out a community of survival tacticians. In either case, any person can contribute to an intimate public a personal story about not being defeated by what is overwhelming. More likely, though, participants take things in and sometimes circulate what they hear, captioning them with opinion or wonder. But they do not have to do anything to belong. They can be passive and lurk, deciding when to appear and disappear, and consider the freedom to come and go the exercise of sovereign freedom. Indeed, in liberal societies, freedom includes freedom from the obligation to pay attention to much, whether personal or political—no- one is obliged to be conscious or socially active in their modes and scenes of belonging. For many this means that political attention is usually something delegated and politics is something overheard, encountered indirectly and unsystematically, through a kind of communication more akin to gossip than to cultivated rationality.13 But there is nothing fundamentally passive or superficial in overhearing the political. What hits a person encountering the dissemination of news about power has nothing to do with how thorough or cultivated their knowledge is or how they integrate the impact into living. Amidst all of the chaos, crisis, and injustice in front of us, the desire for alternative filters that produce the sense—if not the scene—of a more livable and intimate sociality is another name for the desire for the political. This is why an intimate attachment to the political can amount to a relation of cruel optimism. I have argued throughout this book that an optimistic attachment is cruel when the object/scene of desire is itself an obstacle to fulfilling the very wants that bring people to it: but its life- organizing status can trump interfering with the damage it provokes. It may be a relation of cruel optimism, when, despite an awareness that the normative political sphere appears as a shrunken, broken, or distant place of activity among elites, members of the body politic return periodically to its recommitment ceremonies and scenes. Voting is one thing; collective caring, listening, and scanning the airwaves, are others. All of these modes of orientation and having a feeling about it confirm our attachment to the system and thereby confirm the system and the legitimacy of the affects that make one feel bound to it, even if the manifest content of the binding has the negative force of cynicism or the dark attenuation of political depression. How and why does this attachment persist? Is it out of habit? Is it in hopes of the potentiality embedded in the political as such? Or, from a stance of critical engagement, an investment in the possibility of its repair? The exhausting repetition of the politically depressed position that seeks repair of what may be constitutively broken can eventually split the activity of optimism from expectation and demand.14 Maintaining this split enables one to sustain one’s attachment to the political as such and to one’s sense of membership in the idea of the polity, which is a virtual—but sensual, not abstract—space of the commons. And so, detaching from it could induce many potential losses along with new freedoms. Grant Farred calls fidelity to the political without expectation of recognition, representation, or return a profoundly ethical act.15 His exemplary case derives from voting patterns of African Americans in the 2004 presidential election, but the anxiety about the costs of this ethical commitment has only increased with the election of Barack Obama as the President of the emotional infrastructure of the United States as well as of its governing and administrative ones.16 What is the relation between the “Yes We Can!” optimism for the political and how politics actually works? What is the effect of Obama’s optimization of political optimism against the political depression of the historically disappointed, especially given any President’s limited sovereignty as a transformative agent in ordinary life? How can we track the divergences between politically orchestrated emotions and their affective environments? Traditionally, political solidarity is a more of a structure than a feeling—an identification with other people who are similarly committed to a project that does not require affective continuity or warm personal feeling to sustain itself. But maintaining solidarity requires skills for adjudicating incommensurate visions of the better good life. The atrophy of these skills is at risk when politics is reduced to the demand for affective attunement, insofar as the sense of belonging is threatened by the inconvenience of antagonistic aims. Add to this the possibility that “the political” as we know it in mass democracy requires such a splitting of attachment and expectation. Splitting off political optimism from the way things are can sustain many kinds of the cruelest optimism.

#### The impulse to go underground is merely cultural criticism that reproduces the structures of oppression in the status quo.

Mann 95 (Paul, Pomona College, Dept. of English, Post-Modern Culture 5(3), http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.595/mann.595)JFS

Apocalyptic cults and youth gangs, garage bands and wolfpacks, \*colleges\* and phalansteries, espionage network trading in vaporous facts and networks of home shoppers for illicit goods; monastic, penological, mutant-biomorphic, and anarcho-terrorist cells; renegade churches, dwarf communities, no-risk survivalist enclaves, unfunded quasi-scientific research units, paranoid think tanks, unregistered political parties, sub-employed workers councils, endo-exile colonies, glossolaliac fanclubs, acned anorexic primal hordes; zombie revenants, neo-fakirs, defrocked priests and detoxing prophets, psychedelic snake-oil shills, masseurs of undiagnosed symptoms, bitter excommunicants, faceless narcissists, ideological drag queens, mystical technophiles, sub-entrepreneurial dealers, derivative \*derivistes\*, tireless archivists of phantom conspiracies, alien abductees, dupe attendants, tardy primitives, vermin of abandoned factories, hermits, cranks, opportunists, users, connections, outriders, outpatients, wannabes, hackers, thieves, squatters, parasites, saboteurs; wings, wards, warehouses, arcades, hells, hives, dens, burrows, lofts, flocks, swarms, viruses, tribes, movements, groupuscules, cenacles, isms, and the endlessly multiplied hybridization of variant combinations of all these, and more... Why this stupid fascination with stupid undergrounds? What is it about these throwaway fanzines and unreadable rants, these neo-tattoos and recycled apocalypses, this mountainous accumulation of declassified factoids, these bloody smears, this incredible noise? Why wade through these piles of nano-shit? Why submit oneself to these hysterical purveyors, these hypertheories and walls of sound? Why insist on picking this particular species of nit? Why abject criticism, whose putative task was once to preserve the best that has been known and thought, by guilty association with so fatuous, banal, idiotic, untenable a class of cultural objects? Why not decline, not so politely, to participate in the tiny spectacle of aging intellectuals dressing in black to prowl festering galleries and clubs where, sometime before dawn, they will encounter the contemptuous gaze of their own children, and almost manage to elide that event when they finally produce their bilious reports, their chunks of cultural criticism? No excuse, no justification: all one can put forward is an unendurable habit of attention, a meager fascination, no more or less commanding than that hypnosis one enters in the face of television; a rut that has always led downward and in the end always found itself stuck on the surface; a kind of drivenness, if not a drive; a \*critique\*, if you can forgive such a word, that has never located any cultural object whose poverty failed to reflect its own; a rage to find some point at which criticism would come to an end, and that only intensified as that end-point receded and shrunk to the size of an ideal. [2] Then if one must persist in investigating these epi-epiphenomena, perhaps compelled by some critical fashion (no doubt already out of vogue), perhaps merely out of an interminable immaturity, why not refer the stupid underground back to all the old undergrounds, back to the most familiar histories? Why not cast it as nothing more than another and another and another stillborn incarnation of an avant-garde that wallows in but doesn't quite believe its own obituaries, and that one has already wasted years considering? Why not just settle for mapping it according to the old topography of center and margin, or some other arthritic dichotomy that, for all their alleged postness, the discourses we are about to breach always manage to drag along behind them? Why not simply accede to the mock-heroic rhetoric of cultural opposition (subversion, resistance, etc.) that, after a generation of deconstructions, we still don't have the strength to shake; or to the nouveau rhetoric of multiplicity (plurality, diversity, etc.), as if all one needed was to add a few more disparate topic headings to break the hold of a One that, in truth, one still manages to project in the very act of superceding it? Nothing will prevent us—indeed, nothing can save us--from ransoming ourselves again and again to the exhausted mastery of these arrangements; nothing will keep us from orienting ourselves toward every difference by means of the most tattered maps. But at the same time we must entertain--doubtless the right word--the sheer possibility that what we encounter here is not just one more margin or one more avant-garde, however impossible it will be to avoid all the orders and terms attendant upon those venerable and ruined cultural edifices. We must remain open to the possibility that this stupid underground poses all the old questions but a few more as well, that it might suggest another set of cultural arrangements, other topographies and other mappings, however unlikely that might be. In any case, whatever vicarious attractions the stupid underground offers the bored intellectual groping for a way to heat up his rhetoric, if not his thought, whatever else we might encounter here, it is important to insist that you will not find these maps laid out for your inspection, as if on an intellectual sale table, and rated for accuracy and charm. No claim is being staked here; no one is being championed, no one offered up on the critical auction block as the other of the month. There is nothing here to choose; all the choices have already been made. One can only hope, in what will surely prove an idle gesture, to complicate cultural space for a moment or two,

#### We must move to a politics of post sentimentality. The impossibility to move beyond history does not mean that history has to define us. Instead, we should move our demands to the now and away from a historical reading of who we are.

Berlant, ‘98

[Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” American Literature, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668, RSR]

Written in 1949, Baldwin's exhortation to refuse to pass on the contradictions of sentimental liberalism might be taken up by Toni Morrison, say. For if The Bluest Eye casts Shirley Temple and her ilk among the most vicious lying weapons of whiteness, Beloved under- stands that there is no transcendence anywhere-not through a thrilling or a comforting image. Surely Beloved quotes "poor Eliza" in its constant return to Sethe's river crossing. But Morrison's novel shows that when you cross the Ohio you do not transcend it but take it with you. At any moment a woman who has crossed or who descends from one who has risked the water might be walking through the grass thinking sentimental thoughts about the love and family and peace she might experience when she has the time and money and freedom, when suddenly "she had to lift her skirts, and the water she voided was endless," so that a viewer might "be obliged to see her squatting in front of her own privy making a mudhole too deep to be witnessed without shame";34 or perhaps she would be overcome by singing, "where the voices of women searched for the right combination, the key, the code, the sound that broke the back of words. Building voice upon voice until they found it, and when they did it was a wave of sound wide enough to sound deep water ... and she trembled like the baptized in its wash";35 or perhaps, breaking the water of pregnancy lying flat in a boat, she would remember the middle passage or just think about rain and other kinds of beloved weather. Whatever the case, the desire to disinherit a community from the stories that bind it to weepy repetitions of sublime death and dry, safe local entertainments motivates the novel Beloved to show that rather than seeking transcendence of the self who exemplifies the impossibility of exis- tence outside history, and rather than merely repeating the tragedies that seemed long ago to constitute whatever horizon of possibility your identity might aspire to, the postsentimental project would have you refuse to take on the history of the Other as your future, or as the solution to the problem of passing (over) water in the present tense. Sethe's flood poses a challenge to the tears of sentimental culture: to refuse the too-quick gratification after the none-too-brief knowledge of pain. Above all it understands that whatever transformation we might imagine being wrought from the world-making effects of identification must start right here, in the place of corporeal self-knowledge that can neither be alienated into the commodity form nor provide instruction and entertainment to audiences committed to experiencing the same changes over and over again. It asks us to demand of the sentimental project that its protests and complaints be taken seriously in themselves, which involves occupying the present tense with no more time for the big deferrals or fantasies of the always imminent time when the nation and heterosexuality finally pay out fully their parts of the bargain through which they have secured social dominance and ideological hegemony. The old motto of sentimentality might be taken from Fannie Hurst: "Every normal female yearns to be a lumi- nous person."36 But in the meantime, as we wait for the rapture to take place sometime in the always receding future, we might think about living by an interim slogan-perhaps, as Sethe says, "No more running-from nothing.

### Case

#### Their politics is bad because it reduces the struggle to a language contest in an academic forum – ONLY by engaging democracy can we extend beyond the classroom and into areas where we can introduce real change

Bush 11 [Associate Professor and Chair, Anthropology & Sociology @ Adelphi University, Melanie, Everyday Forms of Whiteness: Understanding Race in a “Post-Racial” World, p. 235]

This call, for deepening the curricular emphasis on diversity and race within an economic framework, differs from most of the scholarship that focuses on politics, culture, or identity. More emphasis is needed on developing students' understanding of the nature of society from an economic perspective, which has often been marginalized within the social sciences, as group experiences are often analyzed from the perspective of a collection of individuals rather than as part of a structure. A related phenomenon is that the study of economics often falls under the division of business rather than that of social science, creating a false and problematic separation. "**If multiculturalism is not going to take seriously the link between culture and power, progressive educators will have to rethink collectively what it means to** link the struggle for change within the university to struggles for change in the broader society" (Giroux 1999). **This suggests developing a pedagogy that promotes a social vocabulary of cultural difference that links strategies of understanding to strategies of engagement, that** recognizes the limits of the university as a site for social engagement **and** refuses to reduce politics to matters of language and meaning **that erase broader issues of systemic political power, institutional control, economic ownership and the distribution of cultural and intellectual resources in a wide variety of public spaces**. (Giroux 1999)

#### By focusing on educational situations, like this debate, the aff is doomed to fail. Only organization can succeed.

Middlebrook 10 [doctoral candidate in American studies and ethnicity at the University of Southern California and director of the Solidarity Institute, Jeb Aram, The Ballot Box and Beyond: The (Im)Possibilities of White Antiracist Organizing, American Quarterly, Volume 62, Number 2, June, p. 244-245]

The theoretical basis for AWARE-LA's organizing work was laid out in the paper "One Step Forward on the Path to Liberation: White Anti-Racist Organizing and Its Role in the Struggle Against the White Supremacist System," penned by the AWARE-LA coordination team. The paper argued that "white people are uniquely situated . . . to make choices that can either contribute to or undermine the white supremacist system. It is time . . . for white people to take an active and visible stand against the white supremacist system by utilizing anti-racist community organizing strategies to create systemic change."37 **The dominant paradigm of antiracist work in recent years has been antiracist education through workshop models based on tolerance, multiculturalism, and diversity**—**not on community organizing**. **This approach has significantly** [End Page 245] **hampered the building of a multiracial movement against white supremacy**. **The first national study of the effectiveness of diversity trainings, published in 2006, showed that educational models** alone **have not led to institutional change**. **The paper, published in the American Sociological Review by professors from Harvard, the University of California, Berkeley, and the University of Minnesota, concluded that efforts to reduce bias in the private sector, where the majority of such workshops occur,** have effectively failed. Frank Dobbin, professor of sociology at Harvard said of the report, **For the past 40 years companies have tried to increase diversity**, spending millions of dollars a year on any number of programs **without actually stopping to determine whether or not their efforts have been worth it**. **Certainly in the case of diversity training, the answer is no**. **The only truly effective way to increase the presence of minorities and women in managerial positions is through programs that create organizational responsibility. If no one is specifically charged with the task of increasing diversity, then the buck inevitably gets passed ad infinitum**.38

The question remains, then, what programs or work can create individual and institutional responsibility for racial justice? AWARE-LA, alongside organizations of color supporting the Ballot Box and Beyond, put their focus, energy, resources, and time into antiracist organizing.

#### Decolonizing the mind is an attempt to proclaim innocence and assuage our guilt---proposing specific reforms is necessary to overcome the temptations of this palliative---

Tuck 12—Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations at the State University of New York at New Paltz. (Eve, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40)

Fanon told us in 1963 that decolonizing the mind is the first step, not the only step toward overthrowing colonial regimes. Yet we wonder whether another settler move to innocence is to focus on decolonizing the mind, or the cultivation of critical consciousness, as if it were the sole activity of decolonization; to allow conscientization to stand in for the more uncomfortable task of relinquishing stolen land. We agree that curricula, literature, and pedagogy can be crafted to aid people in learning to see settler colonialism, to articulate critiques of settler epistemology, and set aside settler histories and values in search of ethics that reject domination and exploitation; this is not unimportant work. However, the front-loading of critical consciousness building can waylay decolonization, even though the experience of teaching and learning to be critical of settler colonialism can be so powerful it can feel like it is indeed making change. Until stolen land is relinquished, critical consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler colonialism. So, we respectfully disagree with George Clinton and Funkadelic (1970) and En Vogue (1992) when they assert that if you “free your mind, the rest (your ass) will follow.”¶ Paulo Freire, eminent education philosopher, popular educator, and liberation theologian, wrote his celebrated book, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, in no small part as a response to Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth. Its influence upon critical pedagogy and on the practices of educators committed to social justice cannot be overstated. Therefore, it is important to point out significant differences between Freire and Fanon, especially with regard to de/colonization. Freire situates the work of liberation in the minds of the oppressed, an abstract category of dehumanized worker vis-a-vis a similarly abstract category of oppressor. This is a sharp right turn away from Fanon’s work, which always positioned the work of liberation in the particularities of colonization, in the specific structural and interpersonal categories of Native and settler. Under Freire’s paradigm, it is unclear who the oppressed are, even more ambiguous who the oppressors are, and it is inferred throughout that an innocent third category of enlightened human exists: “those who suffer with [the oppressed] and fight at their side” (Freire, 2000, p. 42). These words, taken from the opening dedication of Pedagogy of the Oppressed, invoke the same settler fantasy of mutuality based on sympathy and suffering. Fanon positions decolonization as chaotic, an unclean break from a colonial condition that is already over determined by the violence of the colonizer and unresolved in its possible futures. By contrast, Freire positions liberation as redemption, a freeing of both oppressor and oppressed through their humanity. Humans become ‘subjects’ who then proceed to work on the ‘objects’ of the world (animals, earth, water), and indeed read the word (critical consciousness) in order to write the world (exploit nature). For Freire, there are no Natives, no Settlers, and indeed no history, and the future is simply a rupture from the timeless present. Settler colonialism is absent from his discussion, implying either that it is an unimportant analytic or that it is an already completed project of the past (a past oppression perhaps). Freire’s theories of liberation resoundingly echo the allegory of Plato’s Cave, a continental philosophy of mental emancipation, whereby the thinking man individualistically emerges from the dark cave of ignorance into the light of critical consciousness. ¶ By contrast, black feminist thought roots freedom in the darkness of the cave, in that well of feeling and wisdom from which all knowledge is recreated. These places of possibility within ourselves are dark because they are ancient and hidden; they have survived and grown strong through darkness. Within these deep places, each one of us holds an incredible reserve of creativity and power, of unexamined and unrecorded emotion and feeling. The woman's place of power within each of us is neither white nor surface; it is dark, it is ancient, and it is deep. (Lorde, 1984, pp. 36-37)¶ Audre Lorde’s words provide a sharp contrast to Plato’s sight-centric image of liberation: “The white fathers told us, I think therefore I am; and the black mothers in each of us - the poet - whispers in our dreams, I feel therefore I can be free” (p. 38). For Lorde, writing is not action upon the world. Rather, poetry is giving a name to the nameless, “first made into language, then into idea, then into more tangible action” (p. 37). Importantly, freedom is a possibility that is not just mentally generated; it is particular and felt.¶ Freire’s philosophies have encouraged educators to use “colonization” as a metaphor for oppression. In such a paradigm, “internal colonization” reduces to “mental colonization”, logically leading to the solution of decolonizing one’s mind and the rest will follow. Such philosophy conveniently sidesteps the most unsettling of questions: The essential thing is to see clearly, to think clearly - that is, dangerously and to answer clearly the innocent first question: what, fundamentally, is colonization? (Cesaire, 2000, p. 32)¶ Because colonialism is comprised of global and historical relations, Cesaire’s question must be considered globally and historically. However, it cannot be reduced to a global answer, nor a historical answer. To do so is to use colonization metaphorically. “What is colonization?” must be answered specifically, with attention to the colonial apparatus that is assembled to order the relationships between particular peoples, lands, the ‘natural world’, and ‘civilization’. Colonialism is marked by its specializations. In North America and other settings, settler sovereignty imposes sexuality, legality, raciality, language, religion and property in specific ways. Decolonization likewise must be thought through in these particularities.¶ To agree on what [decolonization] is not: neither evangelization, nor a philanthropic enterprise, nor a desire to push back the frontiers of ignorance, disease, and tyranny... (Cesaire, 2000, p. 32)¶ We deliberately extend Cesaire’s words above to assert what decolonization is not. It is not converting Indigenous politics to a Western doctrine of liberation; it is not a philanthropic process of ‘helping’ the at-risk and alleviating suffering; it is not a generic term for struggle against oppressive conditions and outcomes. The broad umbrella of social justice may have room underneath for all of these efforts. By contrast, decolonization specifically requires the repatriation of Indigenous land and life. Decolonization is not a metonym for social justice.¶ We don’t intend to discourage those who have dedicated careers and lives to teaching themselves and others to be critically conscious of racism, sexism, homophobia, classism, xenophobia, and settler colonialism. We are asking them/you to consider how the pursuit of critical consciousness, the pursuit of social justice through a critical enlightenment, can also be settler moves to innocence - diversions, distractions, which relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility, and conceal the need to give up land or power or privilege.¶ Anna Jacobs’ 2009 Master’s thesis explores the possibilities for what she calls white harm reduction models. Harm reduction models attempt to reduce the harm or risk of specific practices. Jacobs identifies white supremacy as a public health issue that is at the root of most other public health issues. The goal of white harm reduction models, Jacobs says, is to reduce the harm that white supremacy has had on white people, and the deep harm it has caused non-white people over generations. Learning from Jacobs’ analysis, we understand the curricular pedagogical project of critical consciousness as settler harm reduction, crucial in the resuscitation of practices and intellectual life outside of settler ontologies. (Settler) harm reduction is intended only as a stopgap. As the environmental crisis escalates and peoples around the globe are exposed to greater concentrations of violence and poverty, the need for settler harm reduction is acute, profoundly so. At the same time we remember that, by definition, settler harm reduction, like conscientization, is not the same as decolonization and does not inherently offer any pathways that lead to decolonization

#### University settings can be used to challenge neoliberal control of academia

Pusey and Noterman 12 (Andre Pusey is a PhD candidate in the School of Geography (University of Leeds) and assists with some teaching on the MAASC course. Elsa Noterman studied part-time and assisted with the course for a year, before returning the United States, Inside, Outside, and on the Edge of the Academy: Experiments in Radical Pedagogies, Anarchist Pedagogies: Collective Actions, Theories, and Critical Reflections on Education Edited by Robert H. Haworth, 2012 PM Press, http://rebels-library.org/files/anarchistpedagogies.pdf#page=179, da 3-16-14) PC

In the UK, as elsewhere, students and teachers are currently facing an all-out attack on whole sections of knowledge production and education, especially within the humanities and social sciences, which are deemed less important than subjects more explicitly tied to the generation of profit. It is therefore difficult to see much of a future for courses in the current univer- sity system whose subject matter is overtly “radical” or even “critical.” The criticisms outlined above, and many more, have been leveled at the masters program in activism and social change, developed, and currently taught, within the Geography Department at the University of Leeds (UK).4 The MA in Activism and Social Change (hereafter MAASC) was established in 2007 and is now in its fourth year. The FAQ for the MA states that the course “is not about a detached study of activism, activists, or social change. Rather, it aims to promote free and critical thinking about the challenges we face, how we can develop tactics and strategies and skills to respond to them, as well as creative alternatives to life under capitalism” (MAASC FAQ).¶ The program covers a range of topics from anarchist, Marxist, and ecolog- ical ideas to radical research methods such as Participatory Action Research and Militant Inquiry. At the end of the course students embark on an “action dissertation,” connecting their training in progressive research methods and radical theory with their campaigning and activism. This aims to be a form of assessment, which is radically different to conventional dissertations.¶ Discussing the reasons he and Chatterton devised the course Hodkinson (2009) states, “We saw a real and urgent need for undergraduate and post- graduate courses that would reopen educational spaces for students to develop their own ideas and thinking per se, challenge the neoliberal direc- tion of our own workplaces, and at the same time, create new learning oppor- tunities for those who clearly wanted to take action to make the world a fairer and sustainable place to live in.” Here we can see that the MAASC is identified as having a dual role, as a form of what bell hooks (1994) has described as¶ “teaching to transgress,” as well as comprising a part of the struggle against the further neoliberalization of higher education. Hodkinson (2009), again highlighting the link between resisting neoliberal reforms and the practice of teaching, states that “one of the main ways in which we can resist corporate takeover and the neoliberal agenda is through our teaching.” He has conceded, however, that “there have, understandably, been plenty of criti-¶ cisms from activist quarters of our decision to put on this particular Masters course,” continuing that “a common reaction is that the very essence of an elite-level university degree in ‘radical activism’ is a contradiction in terms as universities are ‘part of the problem’ and the course will inevitably be exclu- sive to white middle class kids who will go on to become a ‘professional elite’ of ‘career activists’ and ‘social movement managers’” (Hodkinson, 2009).

## 2NC

### Berlant K

#### This commitment to relationality is the biggest affective force that defines us.

Watkins, Associate Professor in the School of Education at the University of Western Sydney, ‘10

[Megan, “Desiring Recognition, Accumulating Affect”, The Affect Theory Reader, Duke University Press, 2010, RSR]

Winnicott's intention is to explain the process of differentiation. His focus is the move from what he views as complete union with the mother hence his famous declaration that there is no such thing as an infant-to a position of independence as a separate self with his notion of transitional object mediating the process (Winnicott 1965> 39). In doing this, however, Winnicott gives emphasis to the interaction between mother and child with the development of self premised on intersubjective engagement.• Recognition is central to this process. As Kojeve points out, "The establishment of one's self-understanding is inextricably dependent on recognition or affirmation on the part of others" (1969, n).ln explaining the development of a sense of self, the issue for Winnicott is not simply how we become independent of the other but, as Jessica Benjamin explains, "how we actively engage and make ourselves known in relationship to the other" (1988, 18). Winnicott stresses that independence is premised on initial periods of dependence and that this dependence has actually grown out of what he terms "double dependence" (2oo6, 5). His reasoning here has much to offer pedagogic theory as it typifies the mutual recognition underpinning a productive conceptualization of the pedagogic relation of teacher and student. Another dinJension to how such a connection with the other frames our notion of self is discussed by Honneth (1995, 99). Drawing on Winnicott, he refers to the ways in which infants gain a sense of bodily schema through the process of being held. Intercorporeality, skin acting on skin, the sense of touch, and the affective realm allows one to know one's body. A similar perspective is evident in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body: understanding our somatic selves through engagement with the world (1999). In more recent work in the area of child development from the 1l)Sos, Stern gives a similar emphasis to the role of intersubjectivity in the formation of the self. Yet his starting point and the way in which he maps development are quite different to those of Winnicott. To Stern there is no point at which the infant is confused in relation to a sense of self and other where development entails a process of differentiation. To Stern infants are "predesigned to be aware of self-organising processes" ( 1985, 10 ) . He is interested in how different senses of the self manifest -an emergent self, a core self, a subjective self, and a verbal self-which, to Stern, are not successive phases of development. He explains that once acquired each of these aspects of self continues to function and remain active throughout one's life. These different senses of self are each a product of increasingly complex forms of relatedness beginning with the mother/child dyad as the primary relation of intersubjective engagement. This is an accumulation of self that seems dependent upon an accumulation of affect, which Stern alludes to in his account of mother I child interaction. In discussion of this dyadic interaction and the ways in which infants engage with the world psychologists make reference to what is termed "contingent responsiveness," that is, the sense of pleasure an infant feels in response to a reaction of which he or she is the cause (Benjamin 1!)88, 21). This could involve pushing a ball or other toy and the joy that ensues in making it move. While the infant expresses joy in the response of the inartirnate object, it proves to be more pleasurable if this is accompanied by a reaction from the mother or significant other. What becomes important in the repeated performance of this activity is not so much the action itself but the reaction of another subject and the sense of recognition it generates. This acknowledgment acts as a spur for further action; the desire for recognition on the part of the infant instills a form of agency in the successful completion of the process involved in making an object move. In this instance the desire for recognition is not one-sided; it is mutual The mother likewise desires the recognition of her child and gains fulfillment in his or her responsive play. So, despite the differential power relationship between mother and child, there is both a need to recognize the other and in tum to be recognized. In discussing this dialogic play between mother and child Jessica Benjamin refers to studies that provide a frame by frame analysis of the facial, gestural, and vocal actions and reactions of both parties that reveal a kind of"dance of interaction" (1988, 27). Benjantin explains that "the partners are so attuned that they move together in unison" with this play of mutual recognition seemingly fueled by affect ( 27 ). This interaffectivity is a key concern of Stem. He points out that "the sharing of affective states is the most pervasive and clinically germane feature of intersubjective relatedness" (Stern 1985, 138). Elsewhere he stresses that it is only througlt the intensity of this form of interaction that infants are able to attain high levels offeeling (Stem 1993, 207). What the infant experiences, however, is not simply joy-this amplification of feeling has direct links with cognition. Prior to the work of Tomkins it was thought that affect and cognition were separate and unrelated functions, yet while affect can operate independently, Tomkins was able to demonstrate its impact on both thought and behavior, in a sense confirming the psychophysical parallelism expounded by Spinoza and also the relationality of affect (Angel and Gibbs wo6).• The interrelationship between affect and cognition and the difficulty in identifying the former's effect on the latter is perhaps best demonstrated by an examination of the affect of interest Tomkins explains how in his work on the emotions Darwin overlooked interest altogether, confusing it with the function of thinking (1962, 338). To Tomkins, however, "the absence of the affective support of interest would jeopardize intellectual development no less than destruction of brain tissue" (343). The relationship between affect and cognition and the heightening of affect that recognition can evoke are of particular importance to pedagogic theory in terms of what they suggest about the significance of the pedagogic relation of teacher and student the ways in which a teacher's support influences a student's learning. While the focus of Stern's work is the interpersonal world of the infant, and so his argument about the relationship between affect amplification and interpersonal engagement relates to the early years of life, he is also of the view that while adults can reach higlt levels of joy when alone, this is largely dependent on an imagined other. Intensification of positive affects-as in interest-seems a function of engagement with others and, pedagogically, a significant other. The techniques teachers utilize in classrooms can act as a force promoting interest, which over time may accumulate as cognitive capacity providing its own stimulus for learning, a point I will return to below.

#### The aff’s call for recognition INVERTS the same binaries that they oppose – we should not define our sense of self based on the recognition of others.

Watkins, Associate Professor in the School of Education at the University of Western Sydney, ‘10

[Megan, “Desiring Recognition, Accumulating Affect”, The Affect Theory Reader, Duke University Press, 2010, RSR]

Of course there is always the potential for the abuse of power-it is the tension underpinning the master I slave dialectic-but this need not be the case. In a pedagogic context the dominant position a teacher exerts need not simply be read as a type of carte blanche for the maltreatment of students. This, however, is the perspective taken by progressivists who, in an attempt to neutralize this power and tip the balance in favor of the student, give emphasis to student-directed pedagogies. Jessica Benjamin explains, "Every binary split creates a temptation to merely reverse its terms, to elevate what has been devalued and denigrate what has been overvalued," but "what is necessary is not to take sides but to remain focused on the dualistic structure itself" (Benjamin 1988, 9). This seems a central point in understanding the pedagogic relation and the role of recognition within it the relationship between teacher and student may not be an equal one but its success depends upon mutuality, a recognition of worth by both parties with this intersubjective acknowledgment being integral to their sense of self. Honneth (1995) takes a similar view in his account of recognition. With a more productive perspective on Hegel's master/slave dialectic, he describes how individual subjectivity is premised on the recognition of others. Power here is not neutralized. Rather, it can be conceived in Foucauldian terms as not simply repressive but enabling, with the moment of recognition involving at one and the same time a need for acknowledgment and a confirmation of selfworth. Integral to this process is the role of affect. Honneth explains, "Recognition itself must possess the character of affective approval or encouragement" (1995> 95). Affects, as such, are the corporeal instantiation of recognition, the sensations one may feel in being recognized, which accumulate over time, fostering a sense of self-worth. Moments of recognition, therefore, function as affective force, or in Spinozan terms, affectus. While emphasis here is given to recognition as a positive process with the elicitation of positive affects, this may not always be the case. Recognition can also function in a negative way, carrying the resultant force of negative affects. In a classroom context this may involve a student being singled out for poor academic performance or behavior, which, if it is a common occurrence, may have a detrimental effect on the student's self-worth and desire to learn. Similarly, teachers' sense of worth can be shattered by the failure of students to behave and engage in the lessons they conduct, affecting their desire to teach. Negative affects, however, should not be viewed as all bad In terms of subjectivity they may have what seems a contradictory effect. As Probyn explains in her account of shame, although it is a negative affect, it is only possible to feel a sense of shame if one possesses a degree of interest in the object that engenders this reaction (2005). Shame, as such, has a positive ethical dimension, an essential element of being human. Probyn bases this insight on the work of Silvan Tomkins (1962), who attaches considerable significance to negative affects in the process of learning. He provides an interesting critique of progressivist education in this regard and it is worthwhile to quote him at length on this point. Although the progressive education movement has stressed the importance of engaging the positive affects in education there has been a gross neglect of the significance of the mastery of negative affects. The reason is clear. Since the opposing philosophy of education had stressed rote, drill and discipline it was a natural assumption that the mastery of negative factors was restricted to this particular instance of puritanism and authoritarianism. But even a progressive philosophy of education must include prominently within its program the development of those abilities to tolerate negative affects .... (Tomkins 1962, 368) At Tomkins's time of writing, progressivism was simply a movement. It was yet to achieve a position of paradigmatic dominance as has been the case in many Western countries from the mid-1970s.3 Yet even at this point, prior to its mainstreaming as an educational philosophy, Tomkins was of the view that with an overemphasis on praise and positive reinforcement progressivism had failed to adequately equip students with the resources to counter, and perhaps more importantly accept, criticism, which is an important aspect ofleaming.

#### Even critiques of the topic are set against the backdrop of the international division of labor. Critique only reproduces the subjectivity of the privileged western intellectual. The subjectivity of the Western radical intellectual can best be characterized as *parasubjective*: the sovereignty of the European Subject is smuggled through the supposed transparency of representation inaugurated by the conflation of signification and action.

Spivak 1988 [Gaytari, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, pp. 271-316]

When Foucault considers the pervasive heterogeneity of power, he does not ignore the immense institutional heterogeneity that Althusser here attempts to schematize. Similarly, in speaking of alliances and systems of signs, the state and war-machines (mille plateaux), Deleuze and Guattari are opening up that very field. Foucault cannot, however, admit that a developed theory of ideology recognizes its own material production in institutionality, as well as in the "effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge" (PK, 102). Because these philosophers seem obliged to reject all arguments naming the concept of ideology as only schematic rather than textual, they are equally obliged to produce a mechanically schematic opposition between interest and desire. Thus they align themselves with bourgeois sociologists who fill the place of ideology with a continuistic "unconscious" or a parasubjective "culture." The mechanical relation between desire and interest is clear in such sentences as: "We never desire against our interests, because interest always follows and finds itself where desire has placed it" (FD, 215). An undifferentiated desire is the agent, and power slips in to create the effects of desire: "power ... produces positive effects at the level of desire-and also at the level of knowledge" (PK, 59). This parasubjective matrix, cross-hatched with heterogeneity, ushers in the unnamed Subject, at least for those intellectual workers influenced by the new hegemony of desire. The race for "the last instance" is now between economics and power. Because desire is tacitly defined on an orthodox model, it is unitarily opposed to "being deceived." Ideology as "false consciousness" (being deceived) has been called into question by Althusser. Even Reich implied notions of collective will rather than a dichotomy of deception and undeceived desire: "We must accept the scream of Reich: no, the masses were not deceived; at a particular moment, they actually desired a fascist regime" (FD, 215). These philosophers will not entertain the thought of constitutive contradiction--that is where they admittedly part company from the Left. In the name of desire, they reintroduce the undivided subject into the discourse of power. Foucault often seems to conflate "individual" and "subject"; 10 and the impact on his own metaphors is perhaps intensified in his followers. Because of the power of the word "power," Foucault admits to using the "metaphor of the point which progressively irradiates its surroundings." Such slips become the rule rather than the exception in less careful hands. And that radiating point, animating an effectively heliocentric discourse, fills the empty place of the agent with the historical sun of theory, the Subject of Europe. I I Foucault articulates another corollary of the disavowal of the role of ideology in reproducing the social relations of production: an unquestioned valorization of the oppressed as subject, the "object being," as Deleuze admiringly remarks, "to establish conditions where the prisoners themselves would be able to speak." Foucault adds that "the masses know perfectly well, clearly" -once again the thematics of being undeceived-"they know far better than [the intellectual] and they certainly say it very well" (FD, 206, 207). What happens to the critique of the sovereign subject in these pronouncements? The limits of this representationalist realism are reached 274 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak with Deleuze: "Reality is what actually happens in a factory, in a school, in barracks, in a prison, in a police station" (FD, 212). This foreclosing of the necessity of the difficult task of counterhegemonic ideological production has not been salutary. It has helped positivist empiricism-the justifying foundation of advanced capitalist neocolonialism-to define its own arena as "concrete experience," "what actually happens." Indeed, the concrete experience that is the guarantor of the political appeal of prisoners, soldiers, and schoolchildren is disclosed through the concrete experience of the intellectual, the one who diagnoses the episteme. 12 Neither Deleuze nor Foucault seems aware that the intellectual within socialized capital, brandishing concrete experience, can help consolidate the international division of labor. The unrecognized contradiction within a position that valorizes the concrete experience of the oppressed, while being so uncritical about the historical role of the intellectual, is maintained by a verbal slippage. Thus Deleuze makes this remarkable pronouncement: "A theory is like a box of tools. Nothing to do with the signifier" (FD, 208). Considering that the verbalism of the theoretical world and its access to any world defined against it as "practical" is irreducible, such a declaration helps only the intellectual anxious to prove that intellectual labor is just like manual labor. It is when signifiers are left to look after themselves that verbal slippages happen. The signifier "representation" is a case in point. In the same dismissive tone that severs theory's link to the signifier, Deleuze declares, "There is no more representation; there's nothing but action"-"action of theory and action of practice which relate to each other as relays and form networks" (FD, 206-7). Yet an important point is being made here: the production of theory is also a practice; the opposition between abstract "pure" theory and concrete "applied" practice is too quick and easy.13 If this is, indeed, Deleuze's argument, his articulation of it is problematic. Two senses of representation are being run together: representation as "speaking for," as in politics, and representation as "re-presentation," as in art or philosophy. Since theory is also only "action," the theoretician does not represent (speak for) the oppressed group. Indeed, the subject is not seen as a representative consciousness (one re-presenting reality adequately). These two senses of representation-within state formation and the law, on the one hand, and in subject-predication, on the other-are related but irreducibly discontinuous. To cover over the discontinuity with an analogy that is presented as a proof reflects again a paradoxical subject privileging. 14 Because "the person who speaks and acts ... is always a multiplicity," no "theorizing intellectual ... [or] party or ... union" can represent "those who act and struggle" (FD, 206). Are those who act and struggle mute, as opposed to those who act and speak (FD, 206)? These immense problems are buried in the differences between the "same" words: consciousness and conscience (both conscience in French), representation and re-presentation. The critique of ideological subject-constitution within state formations and systems of political economy can now be effaced, as can the active theoretical practice of the "transformation of consciousness." The banality of leftist intellectuals' lists of self-knowing, politically canny subalterns stands revealed; representing them, the intellectuals represent themselves as transparent.

#### Second, there is a violence DA – merely furthering the notion of inclusion and exclusion STILL EXCLUDES PEOPLE. The aff may include people but perpetuates the very structure that excludes other people. This does unspeakable violence to other in the name to destroy non-liberal ways of life. <Insert aff specific explanation>. This internal link turns all their offense.

Batur 7 [Pinar, PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Sociology @ Vassar, *The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide*, Handbook of The Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 441-3]

War and genocide are horrid, and taking them for granted is inhuman. In the 21st century, our problem is not only seeing them as natural and inevitable, but even worse: not seeing, not noticing, but ignoring them. Such act and thought, fueled by global racism, reveal that racial inequality has advanced from the establishment of racial hierarchy and institutionalization of segregation, to the confinement and exclusion, and elimination, of those considered inferior through genocide. In this trajectory, global racism manifests genocide. But this is not inevitable. This article, by examining global racism, explores the new terms of exclusion and the path to permanent war and genocide, to examine the integrality of genocide to the frame-work of global antiracist confrontation. GLOBAL RACISM IN THE AGE OF “CULTURE WARS” Racist legitimization of inequality has changed from presupposed biological inferiority to assumed cultural inadequacy. This defines the new terms of impossibility of coexistence, much less equality. The Jim Crow racism of biological inferiority is now being replaced with a new and modern racism (Baker 1981; Ansell 1997) with “culture war” as the key to justify difference, hierarchy, and oppression. The ideology of “culture war” is becoming embedded in institutions, defining the workings of organizations, and is now defended by individuals who argue that they are not racist, but are not blind to the inherent differences between African-Americans/Arabs/Chinese, or whomever, and “us.” “Us” as a concept defines the power of a group to distinguish itself and to assign a superior value to its institutions, revealing certainty that affinity with “them” will be harmful to its existence (Hunter 1991; Buchanan 2002). How can we conceptualize this shift to examine what has changed over the past century and what has remained the same in a racist society? Joe Feagin examines this question with a theory of systemic racism to explore societal complexity of interconnected elements for longevity and adaptability of racism. He sees that systemic racism persists due to a “white racial frame,” defining and maintaining an “organized set of racialized ideas, stereotypes, emotions, and inclinations to discriminate” (Feagin 2006: 25). The white racial frame arranges the routine operation of racist institutions, which enables social and economic repro-duction and amendment of racial privilege. It is this frame that defines the political and economic bases of cultural and historical legitimization. While the white racial frame is one of the components of systemic racism, it is attached to other terms of racial oppression to forge systemic coherency. It has altered over time from slavery to segregation to racial oppression and now frames “culture war,” or “clash of civilizations,” to legitimate the racist oppression of domination, exclusion, war, and genocide. The concept of “culture war” emerged to define opposing ideas in America regarding privacy, censorship, citizenship rights, and secularism, but it has been globalized through conflicts over immigration, nuclear power, and the “war on terrorism.” Its discourse and action articulate to flood the racial space of systemic racism. Racism is a process of defining and building communities and societies based on racial-ized hierarchy of power. The expansion of capitalism cast new formulas of divisions and oppositions, fostering inequality even while integrating all previous forms of oppressive hierarchical arrangements as long as they bolstered the need to maintain the structure and form of capitalist arrangements (Batur-VanderLippe 1996). In this context, the white racial frame, defining the terms of racist systems of oppression, enabled the globalization of racial space through the articulation of capitalism (Du Bois 1942; Winant 1994). The key to understanding this expansion is comprehension of the synergistic relationship between racist systems of oppression and the capitalist system of exploitation. Taken separately, these two systems would be unable to create such oppression independently. However, the synergy between them is devastating. In the age of industrial capitalism, this synergy manifested itself imperialism and colonialism. In the age of advanced capitalism, it is war and genocide. The capitalist system, by enabling and maintaining the connection between everyday life and the global, buttresses the processes of racial oppression, and synergy between racial oppression and capitalist exploitation begets violence. Etienne Balibar points out that the connection between everyday life and the global is established through thought, making global racism a way of thinking, enabling connections of “words with objects and words with images in order to create concepts” (Balibar 1994: 200). Yet, global racism is not only an articulation of thought, but also a way of knowing and acting, framed by both everyday and global experiences. Synergy between capitalism and racism as systems of oppression enables this perpetuation and destruction on the global level. As capitalism expanded and adapted to the particularities of spatial and temporal variables, global racism became part of its legitimization and accommodation, first in terms of colonialist arrangements. In colonized and colonizing lands, global racism has been perpetuated through racial ideologies and discriminatory practices under capitalism by the creation and recreation of connections among memory, knowledge, institutions, and construction of the future in thought and action. What makes racism global are the bridges connecting the particularities of everyday racist experiences to the universality of racist concepts and actions, maintained globally by myriad forms of prejudice, discrimination, and violence (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Batur 1999, 2006). Under colonialism, colonizing and colonized societies were antagonistic opposites. Since colonizing society portrayed the colonized “other,” as the adversary and challenger of the “the ideal self,” not only identification but also segregation and containment were essential to racist policies. The terms of exclusion were set by the institutions that fostered and maintained segregation, but the intensity of exclusion, and redundancy, became more apparent in the age of advanced capitalism, as an extension of post-colonial discipline. The exclusionary measures when tested led to war, and genocide. Although, more often than not, genocide was perpetuated and fostered by the post-colonial institutions, rather than colonizing forces, the colonial identification of the “inferior other” led to segregation, then exclusion, then war and genocide. Violence glued them together into seamless continuity. Violence is integral to understanding global racism. Fanon (1963), in exploring colonial oppression, discusses how divisions created or reinforced by colonialism guarantee the perpetuation, and escalation, of violence for both the colonizer and colonized. Racial differentiations, cemented through the colonial relationship, are integral to the aggregation of violence during and after colonialism: “Manichaeism [division of the universe into opposites of good and evil] goes to its logical conclusion and dehumanizes” (Fanon 1963:42). Within this dehumanizing framework, Fanon argues that the violence resulting from the destruction of everyday life, sense of self and imagination under colonialism continues to infest the post-colonial existence by integrating colonized land into the violent destruction of a new “geography of hunger” and exploitation (Fanon 1963: 96). The “geography of hunger” marks the context and space in which oppression and exploitation continue. The historical maps drawn by colonialism now demarcate the boundaries of post-colonial arrangements. The white racial frame restructures this space to fit the imagery of symbolic racism, modifying it to fit the television screen, or making the evidence of the necessity of the politics of exclusion, and the violence of war and genocide, palatable enough for the front page of newspapers, spread out next to the morning breakfast cereal. Two examples of this “geography of hunger and exploitation” are Iraq and New Orleans.

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#### No cards.